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Gender inequality in key indicators of well-being and
empowerment is aﬀecting a large number of developing coun-
tries. At the same time, as we demonstrate below, there is a
great deal of heterogeneity in gender inequality across coun-
tries. Donors of Oﬃcial Development Aid (ODA) have oﬃ-
cially stated that the reduction of gender inequality is an
important goal in development cooperation. This focus on
gender inequality is also at the core of the 1995 Beijing
Platform of Action, the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the 3rd
Millennium Development Goal (MDG) on the promotion of
gender equality and empowerment of women. 1 As a result,
donors have professed to allocate aid to activities that should
reduce gender inequality, to sectors where gender inequality is
most severe, and to countries where gender inequality is a
particularly serious concern.
The question we address in this paper is whether donors
indeed allocate aid in a way that is consistent with these stated
intentions. In order to investigate this question empirically, we
draw on the detailed OECD (2013) Development Assistance
Committee’s (DAC) Creditor Reporting System (CRS) on
oﬃcial development aid provided by DAC donors. This allows
a detailed distinction between aid committed for particular
sectors like education or building up a civil society, and thus
the identiﬁcation of potentially gender-relevant aid commit-
ments. We then investigate whether overall aid commitments
have been higher to countries where gender inequality was
particularly severe. Moreover, we use sectorally disaggregated
aid data to examine aid speciﬁcally for sectors that are related
to the respective indicator of need. 2
While the importance of gender-related need for the alloca-
tion of aid has not been investigated in any detail, related lit-
erature exists. For example, Thiele, Nunnenkamp, and Dreher
(2007) combine sectorally disaggregated aid data with indica-
tors that reﬂect the recipient countries’ need regarding the464Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The analysis in
Thiele et al. includes MDG Goal 3 on gender equality. They
investigate whether the ratio of girls to boys in primary and
secondary education and male to female literacy ratios aﬀect
the allocation of overall aid, aid for education, and aid for
basic education, respectively. Their results show that the pro-
motion of gender equality has received little donor attention.
In this paper we broadly follow the approach of Thiele et al.
(2007). In particular, we combine a number of indicators mea-
suring gender inequality in various dimensions with aid com-
mitted to sectors that we expect to be related to this
particular dimension. We examine the sectors education,
health, population policies, civil society (as well as sub-catego-
ries thereof, including aid given to promote gender equality),
and overall aid. Though the quantitative eﬀects of the statisti-
cally signiﬁcant variables are rather modest, our results show
that larger gender gaps in education and health are correlated
with a higher allocation of aid overall and in the relevant sec-
tors. Greater female political representation and a better pro-
tection of women’s rights coincide with higher aid ﬂows
overall and in some sectors. If a recipient country is strong
on women’s rights, but large inequality persists, donors are
more likely to increase aid. We also ﬁnd some evidence that
donors that perform better in terms of gender equality them-
selves put more weight on indicators of gender inequality in
recipient countries.
GESTURE POLITICS OR REAL COMMITMENT? GENDER INEQUALITY AND THE ALLOCATION OF AID 465The next section describes how we measure gender inequal-
ity and aid. Section 3 introduces our data and method, while
Section 4 shows regressions that measure how aid reacts to
gender imbalances and female underrepresentation (“need”).
We further test whether aid increases following improvements
in gender indicators (“merit”), whether donors condition their
aid on the legal rights situation in the recipient country, and
how conditions in the donor country with regard to govern-
ment ideology and female political power aﬀect donors’ sensi-
tivity to gender inequality in the recipient country. Section 5
concludes and draws policy implications.2. MEASURING GENDER INEQUALITY AND
AID—SOME INDICATORS AND A FIRST GLANCE AT
THE DATA
Broadly, we distinguish between four types of gender inequal-
ity: inequality in economic and social rights, in survival, in edu-
cation, and in empowerment. 3 Of potential interest are both
gaps compared tomen (inequality) as well as the absolute status
of women. It is for this reason that for all indicators where it is
suitable we use a ratio of female status relative to male status as
well as the absolute outcomes forwomen.We calculate all ratios
in a way that higher values are related to less inequality and/orTable 1. Descript
World Bank Regional Classiﬁcation: East Asia & Paciﬁc
Observations (N) Mean
Absolute levels
Primary completion female 134 88.89
Tertiary enrollment female 128 14.45
Life expectancy female 284 66.99
Gender gaps/inequality
Primary completion ratio 134 0.96
Tertiary enrollment ratio 128 0.85
Life expectancy ratio 284 1.07
Missing women 12 0.13
Women’s rights 184 3.71
Women in parliament 124 0.09
Global gender gap index (WEF) 17 0.68
Gender development index* 9 0.90
Women’s economic opportunity 16 44.3
World Bank regional classiﬁcation: Middle East & North Afric
Observations (N) Mean
Absolute levels
Primary completion female 157 73.86
Tertiary enrollment female 173 14.93
Life expectancy female 227 68.45
Gender gaps/inequality
Primary completion ratio 157 0.86
Tertiary enrollment ratio 170 0.88
Life expectancy ratio 227 1.06
Missing women 10 0.23
Women’s rights 162 2.45
Women in parliament 79 0.06
Global gender gap index (WEF) 18 0.58
Gender development index* 6 0.65
Women’s economic opportunity 9 42.81
*UNDP, update by Klasen (2013).better outcomes for women. For example, an increase in the
female-male tertiary enrollment ratio indicates that a potential
disadvantage of women in accessing university education has
decreased. In addition, the absolute percentage of women of
the relevant age group enrolled in tertiary education completes
the picture and allows a distinction between countries that are
performing badly due to overall poor performance (e.g., low
numbers of tertiary students overall) or due to discrimination
against women. The four types of inequalities cover the areas
that are supposedly most well-suited in representing gender
inequality and at the same time provide data of acceptable
quality. 4
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for all indicators we use
in the empirical analysis over the 2002–11 period, as well as
some others for illustrative purposes, grouped by regions as
classiﬁed by the World Bank. 5 It provides details on gender
gaps by region, using a broader array of indicators, examining
gender gaps and absolute levels of female outcomes in the four
dimensions that we focus on. In turn, we discuss one represen-
tative indicator for each of the four dimensions.
First, gender inequality in economic and social rights, which
includes gender inequality in the rights of women to own and
inherit land and other economic assets, and gender inequality
in rights within the family, including the right to travel without
male consent, to gain custody of children in the case ofive Statistics
Europe & Central Asia Latin America &
Caribbean
SD N Mean SD N Mean SD
22.82 77 95.41 7.15 259 86.5 18.06
15.25 97 31.73 20.45 233 22.17 21.48
7.73 129 73.04 4.66 413 71.58 6.04
0.1 77 0.98 0.03 259 1.02 0.08
0.46 97 1.06 0.34 233 1.22 0.71
0.03 129 1.11 0.04 413 1.08 0.03
0.25 14 0.07 0.12 19 0 0
1.18 113 3.92 0.89 294 4.35 1.07
0.09 82 0.13 0.08 190 0.15 0.09
0.04 24 0.67 0.03 49 0.68 0.03
0.06 8 0.94 0.12 20 0.88 0.06
9.29 16 51.85 7.56 17 55.56 6.34
a South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa
SD N Mean SD N Mean SD
25.39 44 58.1 37.04 419 48.22 28.53
13.81 64 3.38 3.63 354 2.06 3.52
7.53 104 58.97 10.34 594 52.89 7.9
0.17 44 0.74 0.26 419 0.81 0.28
0.67 64 0.51 0.36 353 0.44 0.33
0.06 104 1.02 0.04 594 1.06 0.03
0.22 7 0.43 0.35 43 0.01 0.05
1.47 81 2.87 1.33 463 3.36 1.06
0.06 46 0.10 0.08 259 0.13 0.09
0.05 12 0.63 0.06 47 0.65 0.06
0.09 4 0.61 0.15 19 0.81 0.09
10.11 4 41.06 5.07 21 40.25 12.10
466 WORLD DEVELOPMENTdivorce, and gender inequality in marriage and divorce
proceedings. We rely on an aggregate index that includes
women’s rights in three dimensions, political, economic, and
social (Cingranelli & Richards [CIRI], 2010). 6 Figure 1 shows
that gender inequalities according to this index tend to be par-
ticularly sizable in the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-
Saharan Africa.
A second area of gender gaps concerns the inequality in sur-
vival, related to son preference and associated sex-selective
abortions and relative neglect of female infants and children.
This has been captured by the literature on “missing women”
(e.g., Klasen & Wink, 2002, 2003; Sen, 1989). In Figure 2, we
show the female/male life expectancy ratio as one indicator
that measures this type of inequality. Clearly, women are
doing worse in South and East Asia, and to some extent in
the Middle East and North Africa as well as in some countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Third, we study gender gaps in educational opportunities,
which are the focus of the MDG 3 targets. Available data
allow examining gender gaps in primary enrollment and com-
pletion as well as secondary and tertiary enrollment. AsFigure 1. Women’s Rights Index (CIRI), average over the 2002–11 period.
Figure 2. Female/male life expectancy raFigure 3 shows, the regional distribution in primary comple-
tion again diﬀers widely across regions, with Sub-Saharan
Africa and South Asia showing the largest gaps. One should
note, however, that these have reduced substantially in recent
years; in particular, girls now have higher primary completion
rates than men in many developing countries and women have
higher tertiary enrollment rates than men in a majority of
developing countries (World Bank, 2011).
Last, we consider women’s empowerment. Up until 2010, the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) measured
women’s empowerment using the Gender Empowerment Mea-
sure, which was discontinued due to problems identiﬁed with
this indicator (Klasen 2006; Klasen & Schu¨ler, 2011). Another
proxy for empowerment is women’s political representation,
which we show in Figure 4. There do not appear to be any regio-
nal patterns (with the partial exception of the Middle East and
North Africa where gaps are particularly large)—instead, the
map shows large diﬀerences between countries in most regions,
even between geographically close ones. Overall, women on
average face much lower political representation than men in
all developing regions.[0,9] scale, higher values indicate a better protection of women’s rights.
tio, average over the 2002–11 period.
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our analysis. First, gender gaps are low according to most of
our indicators in some regions including Latin America and
the Caribbean as well as South East Asia. Conversely, gender
gaps in South Asia are sizable for basically every measure. Sec-
ond, the regional distribution diﬀers signiﬁcantly across the
diﬀerent dimensions of gender inequality. In terms of rights
and gender gaps in education, Sub-Saharan Africa does partic-
ularly poorly, while in terms of empowerment, the Middle
East scores worst. Depending on what type of gender inequal-
ity donors want to target, a diﬀerent allocation of aid would be
warranted. We address the question whether donors indeed
base their sectoral allocation of aid on these regional diﬀer-
ences in gender gaps. Third, it might be the case that aid allo-
cation is less concerned with gender gaps and instead focuses
on the overall well-being of women. If that were the case,
Sub-Saharan Africa (followed by South Asia) should receive
relatively more attention as levels of female life expectancy
and education are particularly low there. Moreover, if the
focus were on levels of female life expectancy, access toFigure 4. Share of women in parliamen
Figure 3. Female/male primary completionreproductive health and family planning services could be
another area of concern where again Sub-Saharan Africa
and South Asia are particularly problematic regions. We will
therefore consider whether donors are basing their allocation deci-
sions on gender gaps, or rather on low levels of female outcomes.
Using sectorally disaggregated data on aid commitments
provided by the OECD’s DAC Creditor Reporting System,
Table 2 shows those categories of aid in the DAC classiﬁcation
that can be considered as potentially contributing to greater
gender equality. Based on the discussion above, we investigate
overall aid allocation and in addition focus on four dimen-
sions: education, health, population policies, and civil society.
We also include the (rather small) category of aid directly
given to promote gender equality. Health and population pol-
icies have the potential to address gender gaps in health and
survival as well as to promote female well-being in the area
of health, including reproductive health. Aid to civil society
could promote gender equity in rights and reduce gender gaps
in empowerment. Thus, these indicators cover the four areas
of gender inequality discussed above.t, average over the 2002–11 period.
ratio, average over the 2002–11 period.
Table 2. Aid commitments per sector as a share of total aid (period averages)
Sector Period 1982–1991 1992–2001 2002–2011
Overall aid (millions US$) 559.5 821.4 796.4
Education All 4.4% 7.1% 8.7%
Basic 0.7% 2.2% 2.5%
Secondary 0.5% 0.8% 1.0%
Tertiary 1.1% 1.6% 3.2%
Health All 2.5% 4.7% 5.4%
General 1.4% 2.4% 1.7%
Basic 1.1% 2.2% 3.7%
Population policies All 0.9% 2.0% 4.8%
Reproductive health 0.3% 0.6% 0.7%
Family planning 0.6% 0.6% 0.2%
Civil society All 1.8% 5.5% 9.8%
Women’s equality 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
468 WORLD DEVELOPMENTIn addition to investigating all aid in these four dimensions,
we further disaggregate aid for education into basic, second-
ary, and tertiary education. Basic education is concerned with
primary education, the acquisition of basic life skills where
they are lacking, and early childhood education. Secondary
education relates to the junior and senior level as well as aid
for vocational training programs. Tertiary education contains
aid for advanced technical and managerial training in addition
to higher education at universities and colleges. As can be seen
in the table, the share of aid committed to education in total
DAC aid increased substantially over time. While aid for edu-
cation was 4.4% of total aid budgets over the 1982–91 period,
it increased to 7.1% in the years 1992–2001, and further to
8.7% in the 2002–11 period. Broadly, aid for basic and tertiary
education tripled over these periods, while aid for secondary
education doubled. The increase in aid for tertiary education
is somewhat surprising given that basic education was the par-
ticular focus of the MDGs and much related donor eﬀorts.
Interestingly, the only MDG that mentioned tertiary educa-
tion was indeed MDG 3, which calls for equalization of enroll-
ment rates in tertiary education by 2015.
The table shows a similar increase in the share of aid that
can be related to the health sector (from 2.5% to 5.4%). The
share of general health-related aid is highest in the 1992–
2001 period, while aid for basic health increased threefold over
the periods. 7
The most striking increases can be seen for population
policies (from 0.9% to 4.8%) and civil society (1.8–9.8%).
The areas of reproductive health and family planning are
relevant for female well-being as well as independence. 8
Counseling provides information and education about the
use of contraceptives for example, which might prevent
unwanted pregnancies and enable women to acquire ade-
quate education. Prenatal and postnatal care can be seen as
a means to narrow the gender gap in life expectancy and
has doubled over the decades. Aid for family planning, how-
ever, has decreased by over 60% over the last two decades.
Aid to support improvements in civil society for a variety
of purposes such as public sector management, anti-corruption
activities, human rights, and democratic development has
more than quadrupled, from 1.8% to 9.8%. On the other
hand, the share of aid for organizations and institutions that
engage in activities to reduce gender inequality doubled but
remains tiny (0.1–0.2%).
Table 3 shows the correlations between the gender indica-
tors that we use in the empirical analysis and overall aid, aswell as with the categories of aid related to gender inequality.
It is important to use disaggregated data on the sectoral level,
because gender inequality might aﬀect donor behavior in cer-
tain areas, while the overall aid data could be too noisy to
detect any aggregate eﬀect. At ﬁrst glance, total aid is nega-
tively related to most gender indicators: Adverse environments
for women are associated with higher overall aid disburse-
ments. There is a negative correlation between most aid cate-
gories and female primary completion, as well as with the
primary completion ratio that measures the relative outcomes
compared to men. The life expectancy ratio as well as female
life expectancy also shows a negative correlation with aid.
Both could point to a need-based donor approach. However,
this could be due to the inﬂuence of other variables. To the
extent that gender ratios are, on average, worse in poorer
countries, the correlations might simply imply that poorer
countries receive more aid. We will address this issue by
including a full set of control variables from the aid allocation
literature. Overall however, the correlation coeﬃcients are rel-
atively low.
We investigate whether and to what extent aid is committed
in line with measurable recipient country need or merit in a
multivariate regression framework next.3. DATA AND METHOD
We analyze the allocation of aid in various categories from
the sectorally disaggregated DAC database on aid commit-
ments that should be most relevant for aid to be eﬀective in
reducing gender inequality in the respective dimension,
broadly following Thiele et al. (2007). Aid categories range
from speciﬁc ones such as basic education or reproductive
health policies (so-called 5-digit CRS purpose codes) to more
broadly deﬁned categories such as education (so-called DAC
sector codes). In addition, we investigate total aid committed
to a particular recipient to test whether speciﬁc dimensions
of inequality have been suﬃciently strong in shaping the over-
all allocation of aid. These aid commitments (in millions of
constant 2011 US$) constitute our dependent variables.
We estimate our regressions using Poisson Pseudo Maxi-
mum Likelihood (PPML) with standard errors clustered by
recipient country and average our data over diﬀerent time
horizons to reduce year-to-year ﬂuctuations. As Santos Silva
and Tenreyro (2006) argue, PPML outperforms OLS and
Tobit approaches with heteroskedasticity and many zero
Table 3. Correlation between gender inequality and types of aid
Sector
Aid commitments to Education Health Population policies Civil society
Gender indices Total All Basic Secondary Tertiary All General Basic All Reproductive
health
Family
planning
All Women’s
equality
Absolute levels
Primary completion female 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.01
Tertiary enrollment female 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.08 0.02 0.01
Life expectancy female 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.00
Gender gaps/inequality
Primary completion ratio 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.01
Tertiary enrollment ratio 0.15 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.05
Life expectancy ratio 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.07 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.11 0.17 0.08 0.15
Women’s rights 0.50 0.59 0.52 0.28 0.48 0.30 0.25 0.29 0.05 0.45 0.31 0.61 0.13
Women in parliament 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.03
GESTURE POLITICS OR REAL COMMITMENT? GENDER INEQUALITY AND THE ALLOCATION OF AID 469observations in the data. 9 PPML is frequently used for non-
count data in the recent international economics literature
(see Berger & Nitsch, 2008; Egger & Larch, 2011, among many
others). Absolute indicators are scaled from one to 100, while
the female-to-male ratios range from zero to one. We refer to
inequality, gaps, or ratios when we discuss the relative perfor-
mance between the genders, while we talk about levels or
achievements in case the results are on absolute levels of the
data. Appendix A shows the exact deﬁnition of each variable.
As explained above, we calculate all gender indicators such that
higher values imply “better” outcomes for women. It is neces-
sary to use both indicators to measure the relative outcomes of
women compared to men as well as the absolute outcomes of
women. An increase in the primary completion ratio of girls
compared to boys could either imply that female completion
has increased or that male completion has decreased. Improve-
ments in women’s lives might thus take place, but not be visible
in the ratios if male outcomes have improved at the same
time. 10 Our estimates use data averaged over 3-year periods.
By taking period averages we intend to mitigate the impact
of unsystematic short-term ﬂuctuations in aid commitments
that our explanatory variables are unlikely to capture.
In line with the previous literature on aid allocation, we
include a set of possible determinants as control variables
(e.g., Kilby, 2011; Dreher & Fuchs, 2011, in press; Dreher,
Nunnenkamp, & Thiele, 2011). In particular, we control for
(logged) population of recipient countries, logged per-capita
GDP, and a dummy measuring the occurrence of a natural
disaster (taken from CRED, 2012) as indicators of need.
We also control for institutional quality using a dummy for
democratic regimes and the International Country Risk
Guide’s (ICRG) (2012) indicator of bureaucratic quality as a
further proxy of merit. We include a recipient country’s open-
ness to trade and—to proxy for the donors’ political self-inter-
ests—we calculate the number of times a country votes in line
with one of the ﬁve largest bilateral donors in the United
Nations General Assembly; namely, the United States, Japan,
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. 11
We provide all variables with their deﬁnitions and sources in
Appendix A. Appendix B shows descriptive statistics for the
control variables. The list of countries included in our sample
is shown in Appendix A8 in the Online Appendix.
Note that our approach has clear limitations. Arguably, the
indicators of need may be endogenous to the allocation of aid.
For example, the correlation between primary school
enrollment in the recipient countries and aid for basic educa-
tion may understate the extent to which donors actually takelow enrollment ratios into account for their aid allocation
decisions. There could be reverse causality if aid for education
helps to increase primary enrollment (Thiele et al., 2007). As
shown by Clemens, Radelet, Bhavnani, and Bazzi (2012), how-
ever, only about half of total aid can reasonably be expected to
have short-term eﬀects on the economic performance of recipi-
ent countries. Moreover, at least some of the indicators used
here are clearly exogenous, and we allow for considerable lags
between aid and indicators of gender inequality in some of our
regressions. There could also be unobserved heterogeneity,
where some unmeasured third variables aﬀect both need and
aid allocation. We try to control for this by including our con-
trol variables, but cannot be sure that we fully capture all
unobserved heterogeneity this way. In a second set of regres-
sions we focus on the eﬀect of changes in the indicators of gen-
der inequality on aid allocation within a speciﬁc recipient
country over time. This way we can control for time-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity. Still, we refrain from giving our
ﬁndings a necessarily causal interpretation.
A further limitation of our approach concerns fungibility.
Even if the bulk of sector-speciﬁc aid would be used for their
initial purpose, this would not necessarily imply the availabil-
ity of more resources in these sectors. Recipients could simply
re-allocate other ﬁnancial resources. This fungibility of aid
may thus undermine donor attempts to direct more funds to
speciﬁc targets (Thiele et al., 2007; World Bank, 1998). At least
aid for basic education or reproductive health is however unli-
kely to be fully fungible (Feyzioglu, Swaroop, & Zhu, 1998), in
particular in countries that heavily depend on aid. As Thiele
et al. (2007) point out, the observation that donors allocate
aid for speciﬁc purposes such as basic education and basic
health suggests that they expect fungibility to be limited. Alter-
natively, donors might expect aid to be fungible, but might still
allocate aid to sectors to signal intentions. The ﬁne-tuning of
aid to speciﬁc purposes would otherwise be fruitless. What is
more, our aim is to assess donor intentions, and donors can
hardly be blamed if recipients use the fungibility of aid to redi-
rect it in ways that suit their interests (or at the very least, the
policy implications would be diﬀerent).4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We present the results starting with our panel analysis of
levels of gender inequality over the 1973–2011 period in the
next Section 4(a). Section 4(b) turns to changes of inequality
rather than levels, while we try to disentangle the eﬀect of
470 WORLD DEVELOPMENTwomen’s rights and outcome-related indicators of need for the
amount of aid a country receives in Section 4(c). Section 4(d)
investigates whether donor characteristics aﬀect the allocation
of aid.
(a) Panel results for levels of gender inequality
Table 4 shows our ﬁrst set of results and the on-line appen-
dix provides a range of robustness tests and further exten-
sions. 12 The estimations are based on pooled cross-country
time-series regressions with all data averaged over three-year
periods. As we are particularly interested in exploiting the
cross-country variation in our data, we do not include country
ﬁxed eﬀects here (while period and region ﬁxed eﬀects are
included). Note however that we include country ﬁxed eﬀects
in our regressions when we investigate changes over time in
Section 4(b) below.
One might argue that relying on cross-sections exclusively
would be superior to employing a panel set-up without coun-
try ﬁxed eﬀects. However, there is substantial within-country
variation in our variables of interest that we would like to
exploit (see Appendix A2 in our Online Appendix). 13 The
control variables introduced above are included in all regres-
sions but not shown, to reduce clutter. We follow Cameron
and Trivedi (2009, p. 350) and draw conclusions based on
average marginal eﬀects rather than marginal eﬀects at the
means. They can be interpreted as semi-elasticities: An
increase by one unit in the independent variable increases
the dependent variable by b%.
Table 4 investigates whether donors consider gender
inequality-related indicators of need when allocating aid. Spe-
ciﬁcally, we evaluate (i) whether indicators of need aﬀected
speciﬁc categories of aid, such as basic education or women’s
equality, (ii) whether or not the relationship persists on a more
aggregated level such as education or aid for civil society
(“All”), and (iii) whether a particular indicator shaped the
allocation of total aid (“Total”). We relate our indicators of
gender inequality to those aid commitments that can beTable 4. Aid commitments by sector and gender i
Gender indices Total Education
All Basic Secondary Ter
Primary completion ratio 0.739 0.316 0.324 2.478*** 0
Primary completion female 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.016** 0
Tertiary enrollment ratio 0.252 0.329 0.740* 0.437 0
Tertiary enrollment female 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.028** 0.025** 0
Total Health
All General Basic A
Life expectancy ratio 2.464* 1.338 2.792 0.013 12
Life expectancy female 0.000 0.027** 0.022 0.033** 0
Total Health Education
All All A
Women’s rights 0.132** 0.062 0.130** 0
Women in parliament 1.932*** 3.177*** 1.593* 2
Notes: The dependent variables are aid commitments in the respective sector.
include control variables, regional dummies, and period ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
** signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
* signiﬁcant at the 10% level.expected to be shaped by them. I.e., inequality in life expec-
tancy could aﬀect the allocation of aid for health, but should
not be directly related to aid for education. The Poisson
regression speciﬁcation is
Aidi;j;t ¼ expðb1GenderIndicatori;t þ b2Controlsi;t
þ b3Regiondummyi þ b4st þ ei;j;tÞ
where i indicates the recipient country, j the sector where aid is
committed, and t the period of time. We include region ﬁxed
eﬀects and period ﬁxed eﬀects, st.
Among our indicators of “need,” few seem to be signiﬁ-
cantly correlated with total aid commitments. Female tertiary
school enrollment and life expectancy levels are most clearly
related to aid commitments. Speciﬁcally, a lower female ter-
tiary enrollment is positively correlated with aid for basic
and secondary education, aid for the civil society as well as
overall aid commitments, at least at the ﬁve-percent level. This
is in line with a need-based approach, where aid goes to those
countries performing badly on these indicators.
While total aid decreases with higher tertiary enrollment lev-
els, at the one-percent level of signiﬁcance, the category at ﬁrst
sight most directly related to tertiary enrollment—aid for ter-
tiary education—is not aﬀected at conventional levels of sig-
niﬁcance. However, it seems plausible that as a requirement
to increase the number of female students, there needs to be
an increase in the number of women who successfully com-
plete primary and secondary education. The results for tertiary
enrollment ratios—reﬂecting gender diﬀerences rather than
absolute levels of enrollment—are generally weaker. We ﬁnd
that commitments to basic education increase however with
larger inequality. We also ﬁnd that aid for women’s equality
is signiﬁcant, at the ten-percent level, and in the expected
direction.
In line with a need-based allocation, life expectancy shows a
clear correlation with aid commitments. As higher values
indicate greater equality, the negative coeﬃcients indicate
that donors give less aid to less needy recipients. Lower lifembalances – 3-year period panel speciﬁcation
Civil society Observations
tiary All Women’s
equality
.729 1.559* 0.250 461
.003 0.001 0.006 461
.379 0.431 0.722* 435
.003 0.023*** 0.011 435
Population policies Civil society Observations
ll Reproductive
health
Family
planning
All Women’s
equality
.999*** 4.509 13.529*** 0.919 8.657** 672
.095*** 0.066*** 0.041 0.018 0.010 672
Population policies Civil Society Observations
ll Reproductive
health
Family
planning
All Women’s
equality
.05 0.009 0.021 0.032 0.151* 650
.511 0.359 1.004 2.187*** 1.242 404
Data are averages over 3-year periods from 1973 to 2011. All regressions
errors are clustered at the recipient level.
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with increases in total aid. In absolute terms, if a country
exhibits a gender imbalance that is 0.5 points lower, which is
about the diﬀerence between Bangladesh and Bolivia, the
country with the smaller ratio would get about 0.125% more
in overall aid commitments. 14 The increases are substantially
larger in the sectors that are more closely related to a speciﬁc
indicator: A diﬀerence in the ratio of 0.05, which is about the
diﬀerence between the average South American and the aver-
age African country, is related to an increase of about 0.75%
in aid for population policies and an increase of 0.5% in aid
to promote women’s equality. The diﬀerences are signiﬁcant
at the one-percent level for population policies and family
planning, and at the 10% and 5% level for total aid and
women’s equality respectively.
Aid for health is not signiﬁcantly correlated with gender
imbalance. When we investigate female life expectancy levels
rather than the ratio relative to men however, lower values
are related to more aid for basic and overall health, at the 5%
level. It is possible that donors instead try to target gender
imbalances directly through aid speciﬁcally aimed at reducing
these imbalances, and helping women to overcome gender-
speciﬁc problems. Aid for health is more directly related to the
level of women’s disadvantage in health. If absolute life expec-
tancy in a country is 10 years lower, which is about the diﬀerence
between Burkina Faso and Angola or Vietnam and East Timor,
aid commitments are 0.27% and 0.33% higher for all health and
basic health, respectively. Regarding primary schooling, the only
signiﬁcant coeﬃcients are positive. Speciﬁcally, aid for secondary
education and aid for civil society increase with the primary com-
pletion ratio, at the 1% and 10% level respectively. Aid for sec-
ondary education also increases with the number of women
completing primary education. Arguably, a larger pool of poten-
tial secondary school pupils could reﬂect larger need in terms of
ﬁnancing for secondary schooling.
When we look at eﬀorts to improve the level of women’s
rights rather than to reduce gender gaps, Table 4 generally
shows larger aid commitments for countries granting more
extensive rights to women. Aid for women’s equality, educa-
tion, and overall aid signiﬁcantly increase with women’s rights.
In Egypt for example, women’s rights have decreased from an
average score of about 3.5 in the 1990s to about 2.5 in the
2000s; according to our estimates, this would amount to a
decrease in total aid of 0.13%. Hence, while donors seem to
take account of women’s rights levels when allocating aid,
the estimated coeﬃcients tend to be positive rather than nega-
tive. Policies thus do not seem to be considered as indicators of
need, but might rather be seen to be indicative of merit. Note,
however, that the economic relevance and the absolute eﬀect
on aid commitments are modest.
Aid for the civil society, education, health, and total aid also
increases with a rising number of women in parliament. Again,
this indicator seems to reﬂect merit rather than need. If the
share of women increases from 20% to 40%—about the diﬀer-
ence between India and Macedonia or Jordan and Uganda—
total aid increases by 0.4%, aid for education by 0.3%, and aid
for the civil society by about 0.45%.
While we do not report the results for the control variables,
some remarks are in order (see Appendix C, where we report
the full speciﬁcation for total aid without including measures
of gender-related inequality): Total aid increases with lower
(log) per capita GDP and (log) population, signiﬁcant at the
1% level. This is in line with much of the previous literature.
At the 10% level, aid increases with the number of natural
disasters. UNGA voting in line with the United Kingdom
and Japan increases aid (at the 10% and 5% level respectively),while those with France reduces it; voting with the United
States has no eﬀect at conventional levels of signiﬁcance.
(b) Panel results for changes in gender inequality
We turn next to changes in gender inequality rather than
levels. While we think that exploiting diﬀerences in levels is
essential in gauging whether and to what extent need corre-
lates with the allocation of aid, we are aware that this
approach has limitations. Reverse causality might challenge
our results. To the extent that aid is eﬀective, and continued
to be allocated to the same country for some time, positive
correlations between aid and outcomes might reﬂect the eﬀec-
tiveness of aid rather than badly targeted aid when aid budgets
are sticky (see Fuchs, Dreher, & Nunnenkamp, 2014). Aid
might be granted to reward countries that improved on gen-
der-inequality indicators. A negative correlation between aid
and need might thus reﬂect these adjustments. We therefore
modify our regression speciﬁcation, replacing levels of gender
inequality with changes in inequality between period t and per-
iod t  1:
Aidi;j;t ¼ expðb1DGenderIndicatori;t þ b2GenderIndicatori;t1
þ b3Aidi;j;t1 þ b4Controlsi;t þ b5gi þ b6st þ ei;j;tÞ
Note that in addition to the control variables used above, we
now also control for the initial level of a respective gender
indicator and for the level of aid commitments in the previous
period. We thus ask whether, controlled for the level of
inequality and the amount of aid received in the previous per-
iod, improvements in gender inequality lead to more or less
foreign aid. This speciﬁcation also includes dummies for each
country, gi.
We show the results in Table 5. As can be seen, some of the
results are only weakly in line with a merit-based allocation of
aid. Total aid and aid for secondary education increase with
improvements in the level of women’s primary completion
rate. Improvements in the level of female life expectancy are
signiﬁcantly correlated with larger aid in the health sector
(and also aid for basic and general health) and aid for popula-
tion policies. Larger aid (for education and women’s equality)
also goes to countries with improvements in women’s rights.
One correlation is signiﬁcant and indicative of aid reductions
following improvements in our gender indicator: aid for
women’s equality is reduced with an increase in the number
of women in parliament.
(c) Interaction between rights and need
Table 6 furthers our eﬀort to disentangle need from merit.
To this end, we interact women’s rights—which can most
clearly be attributed to recipient governments’ policies—and
those indicators that mostly relate to outcomes, and are thus
only partially under the control of the recipient countries’ gov-
ernments. Arguably, controlling for merit should strengthen
the donors’ need-orientation. Omitting merit from the regres-
sion, the resulting coeﬃcients might reﬂect a combination of
the eﬀects of need and merit at the same time. What is more,
we would expect the eﬀect of need to be stronger for countries
with “good” policies, to the extent that donors expect aid to
be more eﬀective in such “good” policy environments
(e.g., Burnside & Dollar, 2000). Table 6 thus includes interac-
tions between the CIRI women’s rights indicator and the level
of the gender indicators, focusing on sectoral aid. The
regression speciﬁcation is:
Table 5. Aid commitments by sector and changes in gender imbalances
Dependent variable (aid sector) Total Education Civil Society Observations
D gender indicator All Basic Secondary Tertiary All Women’s
equality
Primary completion ratio 0.492 0.519 0.605 1.352 0.978 1.446 0.541 393
Primary completion female 0.009** 0.000 0.010 0.026** 0.011 0.014 0.006 393
Tertiary enrollment ratio 0.110 0.027 0.988 0.089 1.553 1.361 0.376 341
Tertiary enrollment female 0.004 0.004 0.029 0.005 0.020 0.004 0.020 341
Total Health Population policies Civil society Observations
All General Basic All Reproductive
health
Family
planning
All Women’s
equality
Life expectancy ratio 3.145 8.809 3.594 9.342 2.899 23.004 9.479 4.613 11.368 672
Life expectancy female 0.044 0.122** 0.141** 0.103* 0.171*** 0.083 0.053 0.076 0.018 672
Total Health Education Population policies Civil society Observations
All All All Reproductive
health
Family
planning
All Women’s
equality
Women’s rights 0.020 0.058 0.117** 0.118 0.003 0.068 0.038 0.301*** 648
Women in parliament 0.391 0.094 2.320 0.395 0.554 2.472 0.918 5.198*** 245
Notes: The dependent variables are aid commitments in the respective sector. Each cell refers to a separate regression. Data are averages over 3-year
periods from 1973 to 2011. All regressions include the change and the initial level in the gender indicator, the initial aid level, the control variables, country,
and period ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered at the recipient level.
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
472 WORLD DEVELOPMENTAidi;j;t ¼ expðb1GenderIndicatori;t þ b2CIRIi;t
þ b3GenderIndicatori;t  CIRIi;t þ b4Controlsi;t
þ b5Regiondummyi þ b6st þ ei;j;tÞ
Table 6 displays the marginal eﬀects of the gender indicators
at three levels (L) of the CIRI women’s rights index: The 10th
percentile (weak rights, L = 1), the mean value (L = 2), and
the 90th percentile (well-established female rights, L = 3):
dðAidi;j;tÞ
dðGenderIndicatori;tjCIRIi;t ¼ LÞ
The results are mixed and in part consistent with the
hypothesis that donors take account of need more strongly
in an environment of better women’s rights. Speciﬁcally,
donors’ reactions to need in terms of the primary completion
ratio, female primary completion levels and levels of tertiary
enrollment rates and ratios depend on the level of women’s
rights. If women’s rights are low, aid does not react to need,
most likely because aid cannot be expected to be used to pro-
mote equality in bad policy-environments. If women’s rights
are at the mean or high, the correlation of aid with need is
stronger, as reﬂected in the signiﬁcant negative coeﬃcient.
Only countries with mean or high levels of women’s rights
receive more aid for education, and speciﬁcally for tertiary
education, when in need.
We also observe diﬀerential impacts on the indicators of
female life expectancy and female-to-male life expectancy
ratio. If women’s rights in the recipient country are at the
mean or high, responsiveness to need in terms of low female
life expectancy is higher. Regarding sectoral aid, diﬀerences
arise as well. Aid for health is correlated more strongly with
need in terms of the life expectancy ratio if women’s rights
are higher. Similar eﬀects can be observed for aid for repro-
ductive health, family planning, civil society, and women’s
equality, where aid responds to need only at the mean or high
levels of women’s rights.Overall, these results are in line with the hypothesis that
donor countries take account of the recipient countries’
women’s rights when allocating their aid. In most cases, the
results are similar for the absolute level of women’s conditions,
and for the ratio compared to men. In this sense, women’s
rights are a key merit variable that appears to come along with
a more need-based aid allocation.
(d) Results for donor characteristics
Arguably, the overall results presented so far might mask
important diﬀerences between groups of donors. We therefore
replicate some of our regressions focusing on selected donor
characteristics for sector totals and all aid. 15 We consider
three potentially relevant characteristics of donors to group
them for speciﬁc periods in time. First, we consider whether
women’s political representation in the donor country aﬀects
the donors’ aid allocation policies, focusing on the share of
women in parliament introduced above. We expect female
Members of Parliament (MPs) to be more sensitive to gender
issues than their male counterparts. The support base of
female MPs might contain more female voters and thus be
more likely to be concerned with gender-related issues. This
may be reﬂected in the MPs’ policy decisions, especially those
made with reelection in mind.
Even though the share of women in parliament is below the
majority threshold of 50% in all donor countries, larger shares
of women representatives might still be important. If male
MPs would be largely indiﬀerent about gender issues, even a
small share of gender-sensitive female MPs could aﬀect the
allocation of aid. In addition, male MPs might perceive gender
issues as being more important due to the fact that women
participate in parliamentary work.
Second,we investigate towhat extent governments on the left,
right, and center of the political spectrum diﬀer in their aid allo-
cation policies. 16An obvious explanation why this would mat-
ter is variations in attitudes about and the emphasis on gender-
related problems for the respective electoral bases of the parties.
Table 6. Interaction between rights and need, marginal eﬀects
Dependent
variable (Aid
sector)
Marginal
eﬀect at . . .
Total Education Civil society (p) Observations
Gender
indices
(p-value) All (p) Basic (p) Secondary (p) Tertiary (p) All (p) Women’s
equality
Primary
completion
ratio
1 0.945** 0.497 1.224** 0.28 0.271 1.402** 1.177*** 889
2 1.294*** 0.466 1.205*** 0.346 2.007*** 0.206 0.269 0.109 0.256 0.473 1.400** 0.622 1.530** 0.665 889
3 1.675** 0.493 1.979*** 0.401 2.864*** 0.203 0.869 0.124 0.832 0.561 1.398 0.595 1.915* 0.676 889
Primary
completion
female
1 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.004 0.009** 0.007* 0.008* 889
2 0.008*** 0.227 0.007*** 0.220 0.012*** 0.041 0.000 0.010 0.003 0.153 0.011*** 0.415 0.010*** 0.616 889
3 0.012*** 0.230 0.013*** 0.257 0.019*** 0.038 0.004 0.010 0.002 0.224 0.014*** 0.436 0.013** 0.628 889
Tertiary
enrollment
ratio
1 0.927*** 0.650*** 1.255*** 0.596** 0.006 1.112** 1.136*** 819
2 0.930*** 0.871 0.868*** 0.929 1.376*** 0.070 0.789*** 0.964 0.364** 0.986 0.992*** 0.628 1.058*** 0.640 819
3 0.932*** 0.873 1.083*** 0.911 1.495*** 0.075 0.980*** 0.967 0.717*** 0.971 0.875*** 0.615 0.981*** 0.630 819
Tertiary
enrollment
female
1 0.021*** 0.009 0.027* 0.018** 0.011** 0.019* 0.026*** 819
2 0.021*** 0.900 0.019*** 0.373 0.042*** 0.021 0.023*** 0.921 0.001 0.745 0.020*** 0.881 0.024*** 0.651 819
3 0.021*** 0.901 0.030*** 0.411 0.056*** 0.020 0.028*** 0.928 0.014** 0.736 0.020*** 0.877 0.022*** 0.642 819
.
Total Health Population policies Civil society
(p) All (p) General (p) Basic (p) All (p) Reproductive
health
(p) Family
planning
(p) All (p) Women’s
equality
(p) Observations
Life
expectancy
ratio
1 7.323** 7.423*** 7.752*** 7.279*** 15.041*** 16.480*** 26.076*** 2.373 12.290** 1281
2 11.076*** 0.088 13.303*** 0.038 13.183*** 0.035 13.476*** 0.068 21.474*** 0.450 23.821*** 0.504 28.843*** 0.139 3.952 0.724 14.890*** 0.316 1281
3 15.492*** 0.114 20.223*** 0.068 19.575*** 0.053 20.769*** 0.131 29.044*** 0.535 32.461** 0.522 32.100*** 0.169 5.809 0.741 17.950** 0.313 1281
Life
expectancy
female
1 0.008 0.027*** 0.021** 0.030*** 0.048*** 0.016 0.009 0.016 0.007 1281
2 0.016** 0.250 0.036*** 0.273 0.033*** 0.063 0.038*** 0.636 0.060*** 0.609 0.031*** 0.456 0.026*** 0.121 0.023*** 0.628 0.019*** 0.163 1281
3 0.024** 0.249 0.047*** 0.298 0.047*** 0.081 0.047*** 0.673 0.075*** 0.651 0.049*** 0.513 0.046*** 0.154 0.032*** 0.648 0.034*** 0.190 1281
Notes: Marginal eﬀect of gender indicators (level in period t) at diﬀerent levels of women’s rights in the recipient country in the same period (1 = 10th percentile, 2 = Mean, 3 = 90th percentile). The
dependent variables are aid commitments in the respective sector. Data are averages over 3-year periods from 1973 to 2011. All regressions include control variables, regional dummies, and period ﬁxed
eﬀects. Standard errors are clustered at the recipient level.
p-values indicate whether a marginal eﬀect is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those for the level of 1
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
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Table 7. Aid commitments conditional on donor characteristics
Interaction with Share of women in parliament (1 = 10th
percentile, 2 = Mean, 3 = 90th percentile)
Government orientation (1 = Right,
2 = Center, 3 = Left)
Gender of development minister (1 = Male,
2 = Varies within period, 3 = Female)
Gender indices Marginal eﬀect at. . . Need (p-value) Merit (p-value) Need (p-value) Merit (p-value) Need (p-value) Merit (p-value)
Primary completion ratio 1 1.095* 0.233 1.383*** 1.255 0.723 1.217
2 0.529 0.116 0.026 0.888 0.527 0.003 0.621 0.086 0.720 0.762 0.398 0.051
3 0.013 0.092 0.156 0.887 0.330 0.001 2.498** 0.092 0.718 0.752 2.013* 0.057
Primary completion female 1 0.010** 0.034*** 0.009** 0.022*** 0.003 0.012
2 0.001 0.021 0.012* 0.007 0.002 0.001 0.012** 0.113 0.003 0.909 0.014** 0.845
3 0.007 0.021 0.007 0.004 0.006 0.000 0.002 0.099 0.003 0.902 0.017 0.848
Tertiary enrollment ratio 1 0.117 1.041 0.184 0.259 0.003 0.205
2 0.817*** 0.376 0.032 0.265 0.320 0.025 0.356 0.297 0.282 0.135 0.110 0.836
3 1.461*** 0.661 0.867 0.251 0.824*** 0.033 0.970 0.308 0.562** 0.140 0.015 0.833
Tertiary enrollment female 1 0.003 0.026 0.000 0.009 0.001 0.043
2 0.023*** 0.432 0.016 0.344 0.016** 0.018 0.020 0.776 0.010 0.171 0.015 0.078
3 0.041*** 0.710 0.006 0.307 0.033*** 0.037 0.031 0.826 0.019** 0.172 0.014 0.076
Life expectancy ratio 1 1.484 32.375** 0.730 10.832 0.899 12.177
2 0.673 0.526 7.292 0.016 0.102 0.635 3.066 0.160 1.683 0.058 4.306 0.153
3 2.499 0.550 13.340** 0.015 0.527 0.645 4.700 0.151 4.265* 0.060 3.565 0.149
Life expectancy female 1 0.020 0.182*** 0.010 0.116*** 0.007 0.151***
2 0.016 0.017 0.068* 0.002 0.006 0.016 0.081** 0.075 0.009 0.006 0.070** 0.002
3 0.046*** 0.036 0.027 0.001 0.023* 0.021 0.046 0.056 0.025* 0.007 0.011 0.001
Women’s rights 1 0.103 0.045 0.162*** 0.073 0.164*** 0.062
2 0.030 0.156 0.078* 0.846 0.133*** 0.091 0.070 0.630 0.114** 0.089 0.077** 0.934
3 0.032 0.137 0.105 0.767 0.105* 0.073 0.067 0.590 0.064 0.080 0.091* 0.950
Women in parliament 1 0.345 0.325 1.391 0.186 0.163 1.233
2 2.014*** 0.716 1.420 0.864 1.361 0.579 1.478 0.540 1.533 0.025 1.245 0.977
3 3.418*** 0.856 2.355 0.931 1.331 0.532 2.770 0.559 2.902*** 0.023 1.258 0.978
Notes: The dependent variables are total aid commitments. Data are averages over 3-year periods from 1973 to 2011. Each cell refers to a separate regression. All regressions include control variables
and period ﬁxed eﬀects. The “Need” regressions also include the level of the gender indicator and regional dummies, the “Merit” regressions include the change and the initial level in the gender
indicator, the initial aid level, and country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. For the need (merit) regressions we display the marginal eﬀect of the level (change) at the speciﬁed levels of the interaction variable (1, 2,
3). Standard errors are clustered at the donor–recipient level.
p-values indicate whether a marginal eﬀect is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from those for the level of 1
*** Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
* Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
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a greater emphasis on gender inequality. Our expectations cor-
respond to those for female political representation above, but
we expect the minister to have a more immediate eﬀect on aid
allocation policies. 17
The regression in levels is thus:
Aidd;i;j;t ¼ expðb1GenderIndicatori;t
þ b2DonorCharacteristicd;t þ b3GenderIndicatori;t
DonorCharacteristicd;t þ b4Controlsi;t
þ b5Regiondummyi þ b6st þ ed:i;j;tÞ;
and the regression focusing on changes in gender indicators is
adopted in accordance (but with dummies for each country
being included instead of the region dummies). The new sub-
script d indicates the respective groups of donors. We display
the marginal eﬀect of the gender indicator conditional on
donor characteristics:
dðAidd;i;j;tÞ
dðGenderIndicatori;tjDonorCharacteristicd;t ¼ LÞ :
Table 7 shows the results, focusing on total aid commitments.
We show the eﬀect of the gender indicator (“Need”) and the
change in the indicator (“Merit”) at three distinct levels (L) of
the three interactions. The analyses again span the 1973–2011
period. Because we now investigate bilateral aid commitments,
we add exports to the recipient as a percentage of a donor’s total
exports to control for bilateral trade interests. For political rep-
resentation we show marginal eﬀects at the 10th percentile (low
representation, L = 1), the mean value (L = 2), and the 90th
percentile (high representation, L = 3). We code the govern-
ment’s ideological orientation in the three categories left (1),
centrist (2), and right-wing (3). The gender of ministers respon-
sible for development in the donor country is coded (1) when the
minister is male throughout the period, (2) when the gender of
the minister has changed within periods, and (3) when the min-
ister is female. The p-value indicates a signiﬁcant diﬀerence of
the coeﬃcient at the levelL = 2 or 3 compared to the coeﬃcient
when L = 1. We therefore investigate whether the importance
of the respective indicator of need for the allocation of aid
depends on donor country-speciﬁc characteristics.
We expect that countries with a larger share of women in
parliament, left leaning governments, and a female minister
of development will take account of inequality to a larger
extent when allocating aid. We also hypothesize that they
reward merit more than other donors.
As can be seen from Table 7, donor characteristics do seem
to shape sensitivity to gender issues. Only aid from donor
countries where female political representation is at the mean
or above is signiﬁcantly correlated with need in terms of low
female tertiary enrollment rates, an unequal tertiary enroll-
ment ratio or low female life expectancy, and higher female
political representation. Accordingly, countries where the
share of female politicians is relatively high seem to allocate
more aid, signiﬁcant at the one-percent level, to recipients that
also have a high share of female politicians. Surprisingly,
however, donors with these characteristics allocate more aid
to recipients where primary completion rates are high. This
allocation appears to follow a rule where more aid is allocated
to countries that pursue policies and display norms and values
similar to the donor country. In terms of merit, there is no evi-
dence that donors with a larger share of women in parliament
grant more aid to countries which reduced gender inequality.Overall, there is little evidence of a merit-based aid allocation,
which could set incentives for recipients to improve the situa-
tion of women.
Some signiﬁcant diﬀerences in donor behavior arise for gov-
ernment orientation. Only left-wing governments react to need
represented by female tertiary enrollment rates and only left-
wing and centrist governments to an unequal tertiary enroll-
ment ratio. The diﬀerences between governments’ ideologies
are signiﬁcant at the one-percent level, as indicated by the
p-values. Another signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the coeﬃcient is
the reaction to low female life expectancy, to which only left-
wing governments react by giving more aid. Right-wing and
center governments increase aid in response to improvements
in female life expectancy and larger primary completion levels.
The gender of the minister responsible for development
helps to explain diﬀerences in donors’ reactions to gender indi-
cators as well. Only aid from female ministers reacts to need in
the areas of low female tertiary enrollment rates, an unequal
tertiary enrollment ratio, as well as low female life and
unequal life expectancy ratios. Female ministers also allocate
signiﬁcantly more aid to recipient countries with a higher
share of women in parliament in contrast to their male coun-
terparts for whom this has no eﬀect on their allocation deci-
sions. These results are in line with those for female political
representation, and indicate that female inﬂuence in the donor
countries clearly aﬀects sensitivity to gender issues. Male min-
isters, on the other hand, allocate more aid to countries with a
higher level of women’s rights. Governments with male minis-
ters allocate more aid in periods with improvements in female
life expectancy; female ministers give more aid following
improvements in the primary completion ratio and the
women’s rights indicator.
Overall, we ﬁnd little systematic evidence that female
representation in donor countries comes with a more
need- or merit-based allocation of aid. In terms of government
ideology, we ﬁnd some interesting diﬀerences between left-
wing and right-wing governments, but no systematic evidence
that left-wing governments are more sensitive to gender-
related need or merit.5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have examined whether donors adjust their
aid allocation to reﬂect gender gaps or low female outcomes in
recipient countries. In general we ﬁnd some evidence that
donors increase aid to countries where need in terms of gender
gaps and low female achievement in health and education indi-
cators is larger. More aid is allocated to countries with greater
female representation in parliaments. These eﬀects are more
pronounced among donors with higher female representation
or female development ministers. It should be noted that the
quantitative eﬀects are all rather modest, however. We ﬁnd lit-
tle evidence that donors allocate aid based on merit in the
sense of rewarding countries that achieve reductions in gender
gaps, or reduce female deprivations in health and education.
These results lead to some implications for research and pol-
icy. As far as further research is concerned, there are a number
of open questions. One issue is whether changes in the sectoral
allocation of aid are actually due to changed priorities or due
to changes in the reporting categories at the OECD
(Michaelowa & Michaelowa, 2011). Second, endogeneity
would need to be addressed more carefully. For example, it
might be the case that the association between higher
female representation and more aid is not causal but due to
some unmeasured third factor that aﬀects both female
476 WORLD DEVELOPMENTrepresentation and the allocation of aid. While our control
variables minimize this problem, the literature on aid
allocation does not so far oﬀer smoking-gun evidence regard-
ing causality, and our study is no exception in this regard. It
could also be of interest to examine to which degree the gender
of the development ministers in donor countries is determined
by the respective political agenda.
With respect to policy, our results hold lessons for donors
and recipients. For donors, it appears that they adjust their
allocation priorities to countries with large gender gaps in
health and education. While the eﬀects are modest, we would
not necessarily expect huge eﬀects as there are other competing
priorities besides reducing gender inequality. It is interesting,however, that donors seem to do too little to reward improve-
ments, which might make a need-based aid allocation incen-
tive-incompatible. If improvements in gender indicators are
not rewarded by higher aid commitments or even result in
reduced aid commitments, this might send the wrong message
to recipient countries. If donors want to have a larger eﬀect
they might want to reward improvements in gender equality
more explicitly. Here the lessons from the United States’ Mil-
lennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) are interesting, where
the MCC increased aid as a response to reaching a speciﬁc set
of governance targets. Apparently, these incentives served to
improve governance signiﬁcantly in countries that were close
to the threshold (O¨hler, Dreher, & Nunnenkamp, 2012).NOTES1. Speciﬁcally, MDG 3 aims to promote gender equality and empower
women. Target 3.A aims to “[e]liminate gender disparity in primary and
secondary education, preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no
later than 2015.”
2. For example, we test whether aid earmarked as addressing “gender
inequality” in the OECD-DAC system has primarily been granted to
countries and sectors where gender inequality is particularly severe.
3. In a previous version of the paper we also considered gender gaps in
employment (Dreher, Gehring, & Klasen, 2013). We found them to be
largely unrelated to the allocation of aid and do not report the results here
to reduce clutter.
4. The problem of data quality and availability looms large in this area of
research. There have been several attempts to create composite indicators,
for example the Economist’s “Women’s Economic Opportunity” Index or
the Global Gender Gap Index from the World Economic Forum. Both,
however, are only available as a pure cross-section or for a very limited
amount of time. The development of these indices will hopefully provide
future research with a more accurate picture of overall gender inequality.
For now, focusing on individual indicators rather than composite indices
seems to be the more promising endeavor, as data availability and quality
is so heterogeneous between the areas. For a discussion of some of these
composite measures and their short-comings, see Klasen and Schu¨ler
(2011).
5. Appendix A provides the deﬁnitions of these indicators.
6. For a more recent period, the OECD’s Social Institutions and Gender
Index (SIGI) is also available (e.g., Branisa, Klasen, Ziegler, Drechser, &
Ju¨tting, 2014). It is a new composite measure of gender equality, based on
the OECD’s Gender, Institutions and Development Database and
contains twelve indicators on social institutions in ﬁve categories:
Family Code, Physical Integrity, Son Preference, Civil Liberties and
Ownership Rights.
7. General health-related aid relates to support for medical services,
training, research, and management capabilities, whereas basic health is
concerned with aid for basic health programs like maternal feeding,
immunization, malaria, and tuberculosis control.
8. Reproductive health includes aid for prenatal and postnatal care
including delivery, as well as for the prevention and management of
consequences of abortion. Family planning is concerned with counseling
that provides information and education for the delivery and use of
contraceptives.9. Zero aid is prevalent in our data when we focus on sectoral aid rather
than all aid.
10. If male performance is close to 100%, we can interpret changes in the
ratios in a rather straightforward way: An increase in the primary
completion ratio of girls compared to boys, for example from a ratio of
80%
90%  0:89 to 85%90%  0:94 would lead to a change of approximately
0.05 * b% in aid. However, if male completion has increased as well,
the overall ratio might stay constant and would thus not indicate the
improvement in women’s completion rates. The interpretation of the
economic signiﬁcance of the ratios depends on the male performance in
the denominator. For a related discussion, see Abu-Ghaida and Klasen
(2004).
11. We then divide by the total number of votes in a particular year to
derive a measure of voting coincidence between zero and one.
12. Online Appendix A3 shows residual plots for our main regressions.
As can be seen, our results are not driven by outlying observations. Also
note that our results are robust to two important modiﬁcations. First, we
exclude the observations with the largest residuals (the 2.5% largest
positive and 2.5% largest negative residuals). Second, we exclude the most
inﬂuential observations. We estimate each regression with GLM and
normal standard errors, respectively, and compute the hat values. We then
estimate the regressions using Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood and
cluster-robust standard errors, excluding the 1% observations with the
highest leverage. The results are reported in Tables A4 and A5 in the
Online Appendix. It could also be argued that the eﬀect of the level
variables and the respective ratios are conditional on each other. For
example, the eﬀect of imbalances in life expectancy might depend on
general life expectancy. Table A6 in the Online Appendix includes both
variables together for each indicator, with results being similar to those in
Table 4. Table A7 includes interactions between these variables in addition
to the levels. Some of the interactions are negative, suggesting that donors
might respond stronger to imbalances in cases where the respective level of
female achievement is already higher.
13. We also tested whether the importance of gender-related indicators
of need has increasing inﬂuence on aid allocation over time. Speciﬁcally,
we investigate whether and to what extent the correlation between the
allocation of aid and our measures of gender inequality has changed over
the three periods 1982–91, 1992–2001, and 2002–11. The results show that
the responsiveness of total aid to lower female tertiary enrollment ratios,
aid for civil society, and women’s equality has increased over time. What is
more, a larger share of women in parliament comes with larger total aid
commitments in the two most recent periods only. Overall, however, there
are few signiﬁcant diﬀerences across periods (see the working paper
version of this paper, Dreher et al. 2013).
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women’s life expectancy usually exceeds those of men). In general, South
American countries do well on this indicator, while problems seem to
prevail in particular in South and West Africa, as well as in India.
15. The working paper version of this paper also separately investigated
(groups of) donors (see Dreher et al. 2013).16. Data are from Beck, Clarke, Groﬀ, Keefer, and Walsh (2001). The
indicator is one for right-wing governments, two for center, and three for
left-wing.
17. We thank Andreas Fuchs for providing these data, as used in Fuchs
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478 WORLD DEVELOPMENTAPPENDIX A. DEFINITIONS AND SOURCESIndicator Deﬁnition/calculation Scale Source
Indicators of gender inequality
Primary completion ratio Primary completion rate,
female (% of relevant age
group)/
[0, 1) World Bank (2013)
Primary completion rate,
male (% of relevant age
group)
Primary completion female Primary completion rate,
female (% of relevant age
group)
[0,1] World Bank (2013)
Tertiary enrollment ratio School enrollment, tertiary,
female (% gross)/
[0, 1) World Bank (2013)
School enrollment, tertiary,
male (% gross)
Tertiary enrollment female School enrollment, tertiary,
female (% gross)
[0,1] World Bank (2013)
Life expectancy ratio Life expectancy at birth,
female (years)/
[0, 1) World Bank (2013)
Life expectancy at birth,
male (years)
Life expectancy female Life expectancy at birth,
female (years)
[0, 1) World Bank (2013)
Missing women Methodology in detail
provided by the OECD,
measures discrimination of
female foetuses
[0,1] OECD (2013)
Women’s rights Sum of the CIRI indexes for
social rights (traveling,
marriage, . . .), economic
rights (choose work,
maternal absence, . . .) and
political rights (right to
vote, candidate, . . .)
[0,9] Cingranelli and Richards (2010)
Women in parliament Proportion of seats hold by
female MP’s
[0,1] World Bank (2013)
Global gender gap index (WEF) Methodology in detail
provided by the WEF
[0,1] Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi
(2012)
Gender development index Methodology in detail
provided by UNDP
[0, 1) UNDP, update Klasen (2013)
Women’s economic opportunity Methodology in detail
provided by the Economist
[0, 100] The Economist (2013), Women’s
Economic Opportunity Index, The
Economist Intelligence Unit
Limited
Control variables
(Log) GDP Gross Domestic Product
(constant 2000 US$)
[0, 1) World Bank (2013)
(Log) Population Population [0, 1) World Bank (2013)
Bureaucratic quality Bureaucratic quality in the
recipient country
[0,4] International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG) (2012)
Democracy Dummy that takes the value
of one if classiﬁed as
democracy
[0,1] Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland
(2010)
Openness Trade (% of GDP) [0,1] World Bank (2013)
Occurrence of natural disaster Occurrence of any of the
following: Earthquakes,
Extreme Temperatures,
Floods, Waves, or
Landslides
[0,1] CRED (2012)
(continued on next page)
Appendix A (continued)
INLINE Germany (UNGA) Share of voting in line with
Germany in the United
Nations General Assembly
(UNGA)
[0,1] Strezhnev and Voeten (2012)
INLINE France (UNGA) Share of voting in line with
France
[0,1] Strezhnev and Voeten (2012)
INLINE United Kingdom (UNGA) Share of voting in line with
United Kingdom
[0,1] Strezhnev and Voeten (2012)
INLINE United States (UNGA) Share of voting in line with
United States
[0,1] Strezhnev and Voeten (2012)
INLINE Japan (UNGA) Share of voting in line with
Japan
[0,1] Strezhnev and Voeten (2012)
APPENDIX B. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CONTROL VARIABLES
Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
(Log) GDP 680 23.30 1.74 18.86 28.52
(Log) Population 680 16.27 1.57 12.50 21
Bureaucratic Quality 680 1.72 0.90 0 4
Democracy 680 0.44 0.49 0 1
Openness 680 72.32 41.61 12.35 351.2
Natural Disaster 680 0.43 0.38 0 1
INLINE Germany (UNGA) 680 0.67 0.07 0.50 0.89
INLINE France (UNGA) 680 0.61 0.06 0.49 0.84
INLINE United Kingdom (UNGA) 680 0.59 0.06 0.47 0.83
INLINE United States (UNGA) 680 0.29 0.09 0.12 0.84
INLINE Japan (UNGA) 680 0.72 0.06 0.50 0.86
APPENDIX C. FULL REGRESSION RESULTS
Dependent variable Total aid commitments
Coef./SE.
(Log) GDP 0.354***
[0.080]
(Log) Population 0.830***
[0.076]
Bureaucratic Quality 0.087
[0.054]
Democracy 0.001
[0.132]
Openness 0.002
[0.002]
Natural Disaster 0.277*
[0.148]
INLINE Germany (UNGA) 2.353
[4.516]
INLINE France (UNGA) 19.897***
[5.797]
INLINE United Kingdom (UNGA) 8.821*
[4.603]
INLINE United States (UNGA) 3.639
[2.242]
(continued on next page)
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Appendix C (continued)
INLINE Japan (UNGA) 8.237**
[3.592]
Number of observations 680
R-squared 0.61
Notes: Data are averages over 3-year periods from 1973 to 2011. All regressions include regional dummies and period ﬁxed
eﬀects. *** (**, *): signiﬁcant at the 1 (5, 10) percent level.
APPENDIX D. SUPPLEMENTARY DATA
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.
worlddev.2014.07.016.
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